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Let me begin with some words of warm thanks, first to Professors 
Michael Krauss and David Owen for engaging my work with attention 
and interest1 and, second, to the editors at PENNumbra, for soliciting 
my reactions.  This Reply’s principal goal is to clarify some areas in 
which I think Professors Krauss and Owen misunderstood some as-
pects of my proposed framework for restructuring punitive damages, a 
framework I developed in two articles last year.2  Those clarifications 
 
† D’Alemberte Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law.  I am 
grateful to Will Ourand for outstanding research and editorial assistance; to Beth 
Burch, Erik Knutsen, Michael Krauss, David Owen, Kaimi Wenger, and Jeff Yates for 
comments and conversations on earlier versions of this Reply; and to the team at 
PENNumbra for excellent and courteous editorial assistance. 
1 See Michael I. Krauss, Response, “Retributive Damages” and the Death of Private Or-
dering, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 167 (2010), http://www.pennumbra.com/ 
responses/02-2010/Krauss.pdf; David G. Owen, Response, Aggravating Punitive Damag-
es, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 181 (2010), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/ 
02-2010/Owen.pdf. 
2 See Dan Markel, How Should Punitive Damages Work?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1383 
(2009) [hereinafter Markel, Punitive Damages] (explaining how retributive damages 
should work alongside damages meant to achieve cost internalization and victim vindi-
cation); Dan Markel, Retributive Damages:  A Theory of Punitive Damages as Intermediate 
Sanction, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 239, 245-46 (2009) [hereinafter Markel, Retributive Dam-
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address issues including but not limited to how punitive damages law 
ought to address the wealth or financial condition of the defendant, 
the defendant’s status as a corporation, settlement dynamics and in-
surance.  Before I answer Professor Krauss’s and Professor Owen’s 
challenges in those particular domains, however, I will begin with 
some more general observations about what role tort law could and 
should serve.  My hope is that these initial remarks will provide some 
context for the nature and significance of the particular policy dis-
putes we have with respect to punitive damages law. 
I.  PRIVATE LAW ESSENTIALISM 
Both Professor Owen and Professor Krauss tend to see tort law as 
an institution with a nature, not a history, and thus seem to recoil at 
the plasticity and possibility of legal change.3  But “essentializing” ’tort 
law’s familiar practices is not an argument that legislatures must ac-
cept, especially in light of the widely known problems of tort under-
enforcement.4  And my concern is not tort law’s past, or even its 
present, but its future. 
In this vein, my work on punitive damages is chiefly prescriptive, 
not interpretive, and thus asks the following:  in light of the best un-
derstanding of the constitutional constraints established by the Su-
preme Court, what kind of extracompensatory damages scheme 
should a state build?  My answer here is a pluralistic one designed to 
allow juries to make reasoned decisions about which goals to advance.  
Subject to various safeguards and guidelines, my proposed framework 
tries to show how courts or juries could award extracompensatory 
damages designed to advance cost internalization (what I call “deter-
 
ages] (arguing that states should restructure punitive damages in part to advance the 
public’s interest in retributive justice);. 
3 See Krauss, supra note 1, at 169 (“My own view is that awards of punitive damages 
almost always violate a key characteristic of tort law by breaching the private order-
ing/public ordering divide.”); Owen, supra note 1, at 194 (“I prefer the world we now 
inhabit . . . where punitive damages are restitutionary in nature.”). 
4 See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litiga-
tion System—And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1183 (1992) (“One of the most re-
markable features of the tort system is how few plaintiffs there are.  A great many po-
tential plaintiffs are never heard from by the injurers or their insurers.”); see also 
Richard L. Abel, The Real Torts Crisis-—Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 443, 447 (1987) 
(“The tort system does not encourage fraud or display excessive generosity but fails to 
compensate, needy, deserving victims.”); Marc Galanter, Real World Torts:  An Antidote to 
Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1159 (1996) (stating that “relatively few” tort claims are 
brought to court and that, even if more claims were filed, the tort system might not 
have the capacity to handle them). 
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rence damages”); victim vindication (with “aggravated damages”); and 
the public’s interest in retributive justice (with “retributive damages”). 
The underlying pluralism of the extracompensatory-damages 
scheme was not itself new,5 although various ways in which I proposed 
implementing these distinctive purposes were innovations.  Professor 
Owen’s generous remarks recognize these contributions, for which I 
am grateful.  But both responses downplay the fundamentally pluralist 
worldview that undergirds the scheme described in How Should Puni-
tive Damages Work?. 
So, just to be clear, my proposed framework does literally nothing 
to impede the private or restitutionary concerns articulated by both 
professors.  The proposed framework accommodates the victim-
vindication function easily by the proposed establishment of aggra-
vated damages.6  As stated in How Should Punitive Damages Work?, “the 
victim vindication model and what I call aggravated damages are in-
terested in the same thing:  giving the plaintiff unfettered control over 
the choice to seek a remedy, usually in the form of money that would 
go directly to the plaintiff, designed to repair the injury to her digni-
ty.”7  Quite to the contrary of Professor Owen’s assertion that the pro-
posed framework threatens this quasi-compensatory function,8 the 
pluralistic scheme would actually allow both functions to be expressly 
served as the needs of the case require.9  As I explained, “Different 
cases present different problems; not every case requires pursuit of 
any of these purposes.”10 
Despite that pluralistic structure, the responses focus their analysis 
on only one aspect of that framework:  retributive damages.  That fo-
cus is not itself unfair because I emphatically spend more time devel-
oping that aspect of the proposed framework, as it has been the least 
discussed in the scholarship associated with these three potential 
functions.11  But in the course of directing their critical attention to-
ward that “public retributive” aspect, Professors Krauss and Owen re-
 
5 Markel, Punitive Damages, supra note 2, at 1403 n.64. 
6 See id. at 1414 (proposing aggravated damages as one way of addressing the 
shortcomings of current noneconomic damages awards). 
7 Id. at 1416. 
8 See Owen, supra note 1, at 184 (arguing that the proposed framework “under-
mines the private justice demands of victims of aggravated misconduct”). 
9 See Markel, Punitive Damages, supra note 2, at 1416 (“[T]he victim vindication 
model and what I call aggravated damages are interested in the same thing . . . .”). 
10 Id. at 1403-04. 
11 See id. at 1387 n.5 (citing scholars endorsing or explicating cost internalization 
and victim vindication). 
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veal hostility toward accepting functions for punitive damages other 
than the quasi-compensatory one I call victim vindication (advanced 
by aggravated damages). 
Thus, by implication, both critiques endorse a view very popular 
with business defendants—namely that punitive damages awards are a 
remedy best understood as limited to serving private law values relat-
ing to the historical “tort loophole” which resulted in dignity insults 
not being remedied under traditional measures of compensatory 
damages.12  This view allows large businesses to take advantage of re-
luctance by “small” litigants to press claims against “large” litigants, 
thereby creating an enforcement lottery.  Moreover, proponents of 
this quasi-compensatory view can keep the costs of awards down by 
emphasizing to the jury that one should not address the putative in-
justice of what the defendant did by extending a “windfall” to a par-
ticular plaintiff (and her lawyers).13 
To his credit, Professor Owen’s response at least concedes the po-
tential value of facilitating cost internalization or the vindication of 
the public’s interest in fair and accurate retribution.  Nonetheless, like 
Professor Krauss, Professor Owen thinks these other functions should 
not be served by tort law; their shared view, which is left largely unex-
plained, appears to be that only public agencies should pursue public 
values.14  The rest should be left to privately ordered choices between 
plaintiffs and defendants. 
 
12 See, e.g., Krauss, supra note 1, at 176 (“Retributive use of punitive damages 
represents, to me, a pollution of tort law by public ordering principles.”). 
13 Curiously, despite Professor Krauss’s view that punitive damages serve private 
compensatory goals, he believes “that the most coherent federal-constitutional justifi-
cation for judicial control of state punitive damages awards is the Eighth Amendment’s 
‘excessive fines’ clause.”  Id. at 168.  Similarly, Professor Owen thinks more procedural 
safeguards are warranted even for what I (among others) call aggravated damages.  See 
Owen, supra note 1, at 189 & n.31 (discussing the benefits of increasing the burden of 
proof for aggravated damages).  These constitutional views are also unsurprisingly ref-
lective of the interests of business defendants, even though one might think that if ju-
ries are instructed in ways that are consistent with the quasi-compensatory victim vindi-
cation model, then there is not much reason to think awards of such damages should 
be entitled to the same level of procedural safeguards associated with public-minded 
sanctions (such as criminal fines or retributive damages), which by design should carry 
with them more stigma and condemnation than compensatory damages. 
14 See, Owen, supra note 1, at 188 (“The private law should jealously guard its puni-
tive damages remedy to assure that victims are fully compensated . . . .”). 
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Although I support private ordering in many spheres,15 I find this 
inflexible view of tort law to be somewhat, well, odd.  To be sure, I can 
see how respect for private ordering might be very important in cer-
tain domains such as contract law, although even there we have an ar-
ray of appropriate limits.16  But in tort law, as in criminal law, one par-
ty has already abused the other party or its property in some way. 
Accordingly, our society has (rightfully) never validated the view 
that disputes arising from involuntary usurpations of rights create pri-
vate property rights belonging solely to the plaintiff.17  For if that were 
true, it would require the state to abandon the public prosecutor and 
the concern for reducing Type I (false positive) and Type II (false 
negative) errors in the criminal justice system, as well as the role of 
courts and legislatures in effectuating public policy through tort law. 
More to the point here, and contrary to the historical arguments 
made in the responses, courts have long articulated the public interest 
in the preventive and punitive functions of punitive damages.18  This 
view was recently noted in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, in which the 
Supreme Court cited various cases from yore where punitive damages 
were provided “for example’s sake,”19 “to deter from any such pro-
ceeding for the future,”20 and “to give damages for example’s sake, to 
prevent such offences in [the] future.”21  That complicated history was 
also defended and elaborated more recently by Professors Akhil Amar 
and Arthur McEvoy in their amicus brief before the Supreme Court in 
Philip Morris USA v. Williams.22  To that extent, the historical narrative 
of the quasi-compensatory role of punitive damages tells only part of 
the story, albeit a substantial part. 
And the complications go in both directions.  Restitution is also a 
familiar part of criminal sanctions, and not long ago, private parties 
 
15 See, e.g., DAN MARKEL, JENNIFER M. COLLINS & ETHAN J. LEIB, PRIVILEGE OR PU-
NISH:  CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE CHALLENGE OF FAMILY TIES 96-97 (2009) (urging the 
state to repeal bigamy, adultery, and incest laws against consenting adults). 
16 See generally MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 34-
42 (1993) (exploring areas in which limitations on private ordering seem necessary or 
attractive). 
17 Cf. Nils Christie, Conflicts as Property, 17 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1, 1 (1977) (ar-
guing for a system that “restores the participants’ rights to their own conflicts”). 
18 See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2620 (2008) (tracing the 
deterrence history of punitive damages).  
19 Id. (quoting Tullidge v. Wade, (1769) 95 Eng. Rep. 909, 910 (K.B.)).  
20 Id. (quoting Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498-99 (K.B.)). 
21 Id. (quoting Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N.J.L. 77 (1791)). 
22 Brief of Akhil Reed Amar and Arthur McEvoy as Amici Curiae in Support of Res-
pondent, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 548 U.S. 346 (2007) (No. 05-1256). 
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prosecuted criminal actions and collected criminal fines.  So the lines 
differentiating tort, public regulation, and criminal law are and have, 
in fact, been blurry.  And while punitive damages have served a useful 
compensatory vehicle for injuries otherwise unaddressed, it has now 
been decades since that view predominated.  Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has emphasized the public values of retribution and deterrence 
in punitive damages for four decades.23 
This pluralism about purposes is not inherently bad, I argue, if the 
right safeguards are in place.  Thus, if the responses are to carry the 
day, they must do more than simply asseverate a preference for keep-
ing tort law free from public law values.  They must actually explain 
why it is wrong or inefficient or regressive to use tort law in some cases 
as one of the policy instruments in the social policy toolkit available to 
advance the public’s interests.  In this crucial respect, I think the res-
ponses are largely silent.  And it is too bad because one role tort law 
(and punitive damages in particular) can play is to facilitate justice in 
areas where the state, for any number of reasons, fails.24 
II.  PROFESSOR KRAUSS 
In what follows, I turn my attention to the more specific concerns 
raised by each of the responses.  I begin with Professor Krauss, who 
takes my proposed framework to task on a number of issues. 
 
23 See, e.g., Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2621 (2008) (“[T]he consensus today is that puni-
tives are aimed not at compensation but principally at retribution and deterring harm-
ful conduct.”); Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 352 (“This Court has long made clear that 
‘[p]unitive damages may properly be imposed to further a State’s legitimate interests 
in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition.’” (citing BMW of N. Am., 
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996)); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 
(1974) (describing punitive damages as “private fines” designed to punish and deter 
“reprehensible conduct”). 
24 See Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 2, at 323 (tbl.).  Indeed, if we are truly 
interested in a system of justice as fairness and not just a system that is driven by rela-
tive power and wealth (such as that which might be manifested by a disproportionate 
enforcement of street crime), then we might need to allocate more resources to inves-
tigating and prosecuting white collar crime and corporate malfeasance.  As explained 
in Retributive Damages, these efforts would not only cost a great deal of public tax dol-
lars, but they might also be susceptible to various regulatory failures; in light of these 
concerns, tort law can step in and, in a way, help ensure fairness.  To be sure, there are 
costs and consequences when privately initiated suits serve this role.  Sometimes, they 
serve as an end run around our regulatory apparatus and so some limits are also 
needed to protect the integrity of that public process. 
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A.  The Role of the Defendant’s Wealth 
Professor Krauss makes several objections to the consideration of 
the defendant’s wealth in the calculation of retributive damages.25  In 
so doing, there are several instances where Professor Krauss misinter-
prets the arguments I advanced in the proposed framework and the 
relevant law. 
First, and simply as a prefatory matter, the proposed framework is 
not designed to be limited to defendants who are wealthy and power-
ful.26  Rather, I argued that the proposed structure is likely to be espe-
cially effective against the wealthy and powerful for reasons not simi-
larly applicable when using other public enforcement or private 
litigation strategies.27  Accordingly, the proposed framework is not ca-
tegorically limited only to wealthy or powerful defendants, but rather 
litigation would likely tend to focus on those defendants, similar to the 
way that most tort cases currently focus on those with deep pockets. 
Second, Professor Krauss worries that a wealth-adjusted retributive 
damages sanction would be unconstitutional.  Specifically, he states 
that the “notion that punitive damages should represent a percentage 
(between 0.5% and 10%) of a defendant’s net worth—i.e., that weal-
thier defendants should pay higher punitive awards ceteris paribus—is 
in my opinion subject to severe Due Process problems.”28  For support, 
Professor Krauss cites Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in BMW of 
North America, Inc. v. Gore, which announced a concern that wealth 
might be “an open-ended basis for inflating awards when the defen-
dant is wealthy.”29  However, it is interesting that Professor Krauss 
chose to cite to that specific language, because the concerns for an 
“open-ended basis” for inflating awards are entirely foreclosed by the 
proposed cap on retributive damages set at 10% of the defendant’s 
net wealth.30 
Moreover, Professor Krauss’s opinion that wealth-informed penal-
ties violate the Due Process Clause is unfounded speculation.  Justice 
 
25 See Krauss, supra note 1, at 177 (raising due process, proportionality, and incen-
tive concerns with punitive damages, particularly with respect to corporate defendants). 
26 See id. at 176 n.51 (arguing that Retributive Damages sought to “limit punitive 
damages to suits against the rich”). 
27 See Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 2, at 323 (tbl.). 
28 Krauss, supra note 1, at 177. 
29 Id. at n. 59 (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 591 (1996) 
(Breyer, J., concurring)).  
30
See Markel, Punitive Damages, supra note 2, at 1462 (noting further that proce-
dural safeguards make such a system more likely to comply with due process concerns). 
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Breyer’s concurring opinion certainly established no law prohibiting 
consideration of wealth or financial condition when setting penalties.  
Indeed, the legality of that practice has long been recognized by the 
Supreme Court as “well-settled law,”31 and Professor Krauss’s view here 
has simply not been vindicated by the Supreme Court.  Needless to 
say, Professor Krauss’s concern has been addressed by other sophisti-
cated jurists, including Judge Easterbrook32 and Judge Posner,33 and 
while they have raised some concerns, there is no square holding that 
punitive damages informed by wealth or financial condition violate 
due process as such. 
Professor Krauss also challenges considerations of the defendant’s 
wealth from the standpoint of equality, stating that “[i]f a person is to 
be punished, it should be for what she has done, not for who she is, 
even if she is a large corporation.”34  There is widespread disagree-
ment about what it might mean to punish different defendants equal-
ly through financial penalties.  Some, like Professor Krauss, think fines 
are equal when they are assigned using invariant dollar amounts (e.g., 
$100) for all violators of the same legal rule.  Others, including me, 
think fines (and retributive damages) should register against individ-
uals based on legislatively predetermined percentages of net wealth 
(or income in some cases).  Still others might prefer for people across 
various wealth levels to experience the same amount of financial sting 
 
31 See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 n.28 (1993) 
(describing as “well-settled law” the notion that evidence related to financial condition 
of defendant is “typically considered in assessing punitive damages”).  For specific cita-
tions to each state’s practices regarding the admission of evidence related to the wealth 
or financial position of the defendant, see Michael L. Rustad, The Closing of Punitive 
Damages’ Iron Cage, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1297, 1316 n.108 (2005); 1 LINDA L. SCHLU-
ETER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 5.3(F) (5th ed. 2009).  
32 Professor Krauss cites Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in Zazú Designs v. L’Oréal, 
S.A.  See 979 F.2d 499, 509 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Corporate size is a reason to magnify dam-
ages only when the wrongs of larger firms are less likely to be punished; yet judges 
rarely have any reason to suppose this, and the court in this case had none.”).  Impor-
tantly, those are also arguments I addressed in Retributive Damages.  Markel, Retributive 
Damages, supra note 2, at 294-96.  Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in that case examines 
the punitive damages award primarily through the lens of cost internalization, not re-
tribution (because the panel did not find the defendant’s conduct to be antisocial), 
and focuses on the award against a corporation, which may raise different issues, a 
point I made in the proposed framework on several occasions.   
33 See Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2003) (not-
ing that a wealthy defendant can “mount an extremely aggressive defense . . . and by 
doing so . . . make litigating against it very costly, which in turn may make it difficult 
for the plaintiffs to find a lawyer willing to handle their case, involving as it does only 
modest stakes, for the usual 33-40 percent contingent fee”). 
34 Krauss, supra note 1, at 177. 
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and thus either use a progressively scaled fine system to account for 
the diminishing utility of money or brain scans and other technolo-
gies to determine what amount of punishment would cause the right 
(and equal) number of disutils.35  In other words, there are different 
benchmarks to which one can appeal in trying to achieve equality in 
this regard: flat dollar amounts, percentages of equal wealth, or dis-
utils.  Many jurisdictions around the world and within the United 
States use income or wealth-adjusted fines.36  This dispute is simply 
about how to punish in an equal manner.  The reasonable disagree-
ment over this issue might be why there has been no constitutional 
prohibition under due process or equal protection for using wealth as 
a consideration.  Moreover, the method that I endorsed was already 
defended against claims that it would raise constitutional and policy 
concerns at length earlier in the companion article, and these argu-
ments do not warrant repetition here.37 
That said, it should be clarified that the purpose of incorporating 
the defendant’s wealth or financial condition into the calculation of 
retributive damages is not because it is thought that wealthier defen-
dants should have to take greater care than everyone else in society.38  
Rather, wealthier tortfeasors should be punished, like all people, in a 
manner that adequately communicates to them that their risk-
imposing, wrongful behavior is not subject to a price but rather a 
sanction.  A wealth-adjusted sanction helps achieve that adequate 
communication.  Less abstractly, we do not want the wealthy to think 
that they can wrongfully injure poor persons simply because the com-
pensation needed to remedy those injuries is lower than would be the 
case were the same conduct targeted at wealthier people.39 
 
35 See generally Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. 
L. REV. 182, 186 (2009) (arguing for a system of punishment that considers, and is ca-
librated to, the subjective experiences of offenders).  
36 See Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 2, at 289 (“Currently more than half a 
dozen American jurisdictions use . . . a program of day fines, which are prevalent in 
Europe, where a judge follows an established scale and assigns an offense a number 
based on its severity, and that number is multiplied by the defendant’s daily income.”). 
37 Id. at 290-96, 327-35. 
38 But see Krauss, supra note 1, at 177 (“[S]ome have argued that the rich need 
greater deterrents than do the poor.” (citing Jennifer H. Arlen, Should Defendants’ 
Wealth Matter?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 413, 422-23 (1992))).  
39 As explained in Retributive Damages, however, some types of misconduct (e.g., 
those aimed only at financial injury, such as fraud) might plausibly be subjected to a 
different kind of sanction strategy (such as a multiplier of the compensatory damages) 
as long as the retributive sanction put the defendant in an objectively worse position 
than when he began his misconduct, even after accounting for restitution and legal 
costs.  Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 2, at 290 & n.181. 
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B.  Concerns Regarding the Defendant’s Net Value When the  
Defendant Is an Entity 
Professor Krauss creates the false impression that I have neither 
addressed nor “thought through” the issue that if net wealth were 
used as a benchmark for setting financial penalties against corpora-
tions, it would spur “corporations to favor debt over equity at the mar-
gin and to dole out more in dividends than otherwise would be the 
case, so as to lower their expected outlays of punitive damages.”40  
However, this issue is discussed in my articles, and I say precisely the 
same thing (and cite the very same passage from Judge Posner’s opi-
nion in Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc.) that Professor Krauss 
does about why using net worth or wealth for corporate entities would 
not be the appropriate benchmark.41  Accordingly, while Professor 
Krauss’s critique of that position may have merit in this regard, it is 
the very critique I make against a position I do not adopt. 
Only later in the paragraph does Professor Krauss advert to what 
was actually said: that the measure of punishment should track net 
value of a corporation.  But this term is described by Professor Krauss 
in his text as “undefined.”42  To the contrary, as he recognized in a 
footnote, I propose that net value of a corporation could be assessed 
based on “valuation models used on Wall Street.”43  Banks and accoun-
tants use various measures to assess the value of corporate entities 
whenever they are advising on mergers and acquisitions.  I would 
leave it to expert witnesses to provide this kind of information to the 
court (or the jury, if the jurisdiction preferred) to make that fine-
grained assessment.  A standard is not “undefined” simply because it is 
not a rule. 
Finally, we get to Professor Krauss’s main objection, which clearly 
understands that net value is not undefined but rather reflects the 
kind of valuation models used for assessing transactions on Wall 
Street.  Professor Krauss asks:  “Why should a corporation that wastes 
social resources while committing evil deeds pay less in punitive dam-
ages than a corporation whose tremendous contributions to consumer 
surplus have positively affected its takeover price?”44 
 
40 Krauss, supra note 1, at 177. 
41 Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 2, at 289 n.178 and accompanying text. 
42 Krauss, supra note 1, at 177. 
43 Id. at 178 n.64. 
44 Id. at 178. 
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This is an interesting question.  But it is really no different con-
ceptually from asking why a wealthy person should be punished more 
in dollar terms than a poor person.  After all, a person who is wealthy 
and later becomes poor—perhaps because of a penchant for wasting 
social resources—would still end up paying less money in retributive 
damages if he is sanctioned than someone who began wealthy and 
stayed wealthy.  As mentioned earlier, I have already addressed the 
question of wealth at some length in the individual context in Retribu-
tive Damages,45 and, as noted in that article, I plan on explaining at 
greater length why that argument applies in the corporate context.  I 
do not intend to foreshadow that argument in this reply, but needless 
to say, I am not the only person who believes that corporations can 
reasonably be thought to be fit subjects for punishment on a variety of 
rationales46 and that the financial condition of such entities may be a 
relevant consideration.47  As some indication of the plausibility of such 
a view, it is worth noting that American law has allowed corporations 
to be punished through both criminal and civil penalties for over a 
hundred years.48  Thus, while I may be wrong on the merits of whether 
it makes sense to punish corporations, I am, at least, not alone. 
 
45 Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 2, at 289-96, 309-16. 
46 Cf. BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRATHWAITE, CORPORATIONS, CRIME AND ACCOUNTA-
BILITY 15 (1993) (“[T]he law should hold an axe over the head of a corporation that 
has committed the actus reus of a criminal offence. . . . The private justice system of the 
firm is then put to work under the shadow of the axe.”); PETER A. FRENCH, COLLECTIVE 
AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, at ix (1984) (“Corporations are far from being social 
fictions.  A moral theory that must treat them as such is sadly impoverished.”); Amy J. 
Sepinwall, Shared Responsibility for Corporate Crime (2009) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author) (explaining how corporate criminal liability can be justified 
in terms of retributive theory).  The literature providing justifications for corporate 
criminal liability would likely also permit corporate liability for intermediate civil sanc-
tions, such as retributive damages. 
47 See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, A Theory of Wealth and Punitive Damages, 17 WIDENER L. 
J. 927, 946 (2008) (arguing, on economic-deterrence grounds, that business entities 
ought to face punitive damages based on financial condition in some contexts).   
48  See New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494-95 
(1909) (“[T]here are some crimes, which in their nature cannot be committed by cor-
porations.  But there is a large class of offenses [for which corporations may be held 
responsible].”); see also Regina v. St. Lawrence Corp., [1969] 5 D.L.R. 263 (Can.) 
(“Modern law has taken us to a position far removed from the primitive notion that a 
corporation, being but an abstraction having no mind or body of its own, was not ca-
pable of committing a crime . . . .”); see generally Melissa Ku & Lee Pepper, Corporate 
Criminal Liability, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 275 (2008) (explaining the principles guiding 
corporate criminal liability).  
294 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 158: 283 
PENNumbra 
C.  Concerns Regarding Criminal Prosecution and Civil Litigation 
Professor Krauss also expresses concern that the coexistence of re-
tributive damages and criminal prosecution will result in practical and 
political problems.49  For instance, he worries that politics may result 
in criminal prosecution being delayed “so that the ‘prize’ for misbe-
havior can accrue to a politically favored private party and not to the 
state.”50  This scenario is entirely unlikely, however.  The only “prize” 
to be enjoyed by a private party under the retributive damages struc-
ture is the finder’s fee that the legislature decides to award.  My rec-
ommendation was that such a fee should be relatively modest and in a 
flat amount across a range of cases—something like $10,000.51  How 
often would a government attorney be willing to delay prosecution 
(and risk disbarment or worse based on breaches of professional eth-
ics) so that a private plaintiff could collect $10,000? 
Professor Krauss also worries that “innocent corporations” would, 
under the proposed retributive damages framework, begin to plead 
guilty to crimes in order “to avoid confiscatory punitive damages.”52  
This concern is misplaced for a number of reasons.  Implicit in this 
concern is the notion that retributive damages would constitute signif-
icantly higher award amounts than comparable fines or penalties as-
sociated with admitting to illegal activities in criminal court.  However, 
the retributive damages scheme would not be established in a vacuum 
isolated from the rest of public policy.  The regime would involve, 
among other tasks, state legislative action to carefully craft and con-
struct a reprehensibility scale by which to measure the conduct of a 
defendant.53  As such, the legislature could and should determine 
whether the underlying values of its other laws would be usurped or 
undermined and then utilize its authority to make sure that the system 
achieves the right balance of its pertinent policy goals.  The legisla-
ture, under the proposed framework, would be encouraged to make 
sure that criminal penalties exceed retributive damages,54 although 
 
49 See Krauss, supra note 1, at 178 (arguing that offsets may lead to “sweetheart 
deals” for politically favored private parties). 
50 Id. 
51 Markel, Punitive Damages, supra note 2, at 1402.  
52 Krauss, supra note 1, at 178. 
53 See Markel, Punitive Damages, supra note 2, at 1400-01 (explaining that the re-
prehensibility score would then be matched to a schedule for retributive damages ad-
justed by financial condition). 
54 See id. at 1431 n.156 (“If retributive damages are truly going to be intermediate 
in nature, then jurisdictions . . . may also have to adjust fines in the criminal context to 
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they would not be required to ensure that the only currency of pu-
nishment here is financial in nature. 
Second, and related to that last point, there are many different 
costs that a corporation pleading guilty may incur aside from mone-
tary penalties.  For instance, corporations could lose valuable permits 
or suffer negative public relations consequences as a result of admit-
ting to crimes. 
Third, a corporation is only eligible for retributive damages sanc-
tions if it commits reckless or malicious conduct.  In situations where 
the entity did in fact commit certain reckless or malicious conduct 
warranting retributive damages, there would not be a problem of a 
corporation ostensibly “innocent” of any wrongdoing finding itself 
pleading guilty to a crime.  Moreover, the proposed framework calls 
for enhanced procedural safeguards that would not be otherwise 
available in tort cases.  Accordingly, one has to wonder whether a cor-
poration’s officers would fear a Type I error in adjudication of retri-
butive damages so much that it would agree to plead guilty to a crime 
it did not commit.  This scenario seems especially implausible because 
defendants pleading guilty to a crime have to convince a prosecutor 
and then a judge that in fact a crime has been committed. Typically, 
judges are required to go through a plea colloquy with a defendant to 
ensure that any plea of guilty to a crime has a basis before it is ac-
cepted by the court.  If the officers of a corporation say the corpora-
tion committed a crime that it did not commit simply to buy itself re-
pose against retributive damages, they have committed perjury.  The 
officers would be on the hook to the state and to their shareholders in 
derivative litigation. 
The real concern seems to be focused on what defendants might 
do in fear of mistaken adjudications in retributive damages trials.  
This more plausible concern arises in situations in which recklessness 
might be ascribed to a corporation that engages in cost-benefit analy-
sis regarding the safety of its products.  In that situation, an entity that 
weighs profits against safety improvements could be adjudged “reck-
less” for not taking the safety precautions because they viewed the 
costs of doing so (by estimating likely liability, profits and elasticity of 
demand) as insufficient to justify the safety improvement.  The con-
cern here focuses on a Type I error in which a corporate defendant is 
 
always be some amount greater than the amount awarded in retributive damages for 
similar misconduct.”). 
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wrongly determined to have been reckless (as opposed to one in 
which the innocent defendant pleads guilty). 
The answer to this concern is complicated, but in short, there are 
several responses.  First, the standard of recklessness to which I have 
been adverting tracks the one used in the Model Penal Code, and in 
that context, a defendant must have consciously disregarded a “sub-
stantial and unjustifiable risk” and the disregard of that risk has to be 
one that involves “a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that 
a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.”55  That is 
a difficult standard to satisfy actually, and it is not clear why—as ap-
plied to entities who might be tempted to externalize risks to others—
it is unfair.  Second, as mentioned before, cases involving retributive 
damages also entail heightened procedural safeguards.  Third, if we 
do not think that the standard of conduct and the procedural safe-
guards are sufficient to allay concerns of Type I false positives, then 
that concern provides another reason to bolster my support for insur-
ance for retributive damages arising from reckless conduct on the part 
of the defendant.  Indeed, this was one of the justifications for insur-
ance to which Professor Owen rightly alluded in his response.56  States 
disallowing insurance in these contexts should revise their policies. 
D.  Concerns Regarding Settlement, Sweetheart  
Deals, and Insurance 
Professor Krauss also challenges the proposed framework on the 
ground that the “courts are utterly ill-equipped to deal effectively with 
the settlement process,” claiming that close supervision would be re-
quired to prevent sweetheart deals between plaintiffs and defendants 
that would cheat the state out of collecting its bounty of retributive 
damages.57  This issue was addressed in the proposed framework, 
which calls for concurrent implementation of changes to the re-
quirements that plaintiffs must meet should they wish to seek retribu-
tive damages.58  Plaintiffs who have failed to plead the type of miscon-
duct that would give rise to a retributive damages claim would be 
prevented from altering their claims later to include such conduct.59  
 
55 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1981). 
56 Owen, supra note 1, at 190. 
57 Krauss, supra note 1, at 178. 
58 See Markel, Punitive Damages, supra note 2, at 1473-74 (outlining the restrictions to be 
placed on plaintiffs who seek retributive damages so as to prevent sandbagging defendants). 
59 See id. at 1473 (proposing that “compelling circumstances” should be required 
to allow complaint amendments).  
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Once this conduct is included in complaints, the state, and not just the 
courts, would be alerted to the need to supervise the settlement process.60 
Following this alert, the state would then review and authorize set-
tlements, with the ability to object to potential sweetheart deals and 
purchase the claim for the aforementioned “finder’s fee” of a certain 
amount, such as ten thousand dollars.61  The procedural pleading re-
quirements combined with the ability to purchase the retributive 
damages claim would go far toward modifying the current system to 
prevent sweetheart-deal collusion.  The presence of the threat of a 
private attorney general (PAG) who is empowered to follow up on a 
suit that the government declines to bring is a further incentive for 
defendants to resist any attempts by plaintiffs to shake them down 
prior to filing; if defendants wanted repose against PAGs, they would 
have to acquire it through state supervision of the settlement. 
Finally, Professor Krauss wonders whether such collusion concerns 
would require retributive damages insurance to be mandatory.62  This 
is a puzzling question.  There is no necessary link between the pro-
posed framework’s attempt to address sweetheart deals, which, absent 
the safeguards, would likely occur with or without insurance, and the 
availability of insurance for certain conduct that might trigger retribu-
tive damages.  That said, there is no requirement upon anyone to buy 
insurance for retributive damages.  The private ordering that Profes-
sor Krauss venerates so much would be allowed under the proposed 
framework such that if insurance companies want to offer insurance 
for retributive damages, they would be permitted to do so, and they 
would be allowed to charge what they thought they needed to in order 
to make it worth their while.63 
 
60 Id. at 1473-74. 
61 Id. at 1474. 
62 See Krauss, supra note 1, at 178 (questioning whether such insurance, if not 
mandated by statute, would lead to adverse selection problems). 
63 For what it is worth, I would have no problem with legislation that forbade the 
issuance of insurance contracts that covered intentional harms, though as described 
further infra, there is not much need to do so because insurance companies are in the 
business of insuring for “insurable risks” and intentional harms are not included in 
that category.  Indeed standard insurance agreements include phrases excluding cov-
erage for intended or expected losses.  The question of who should benefit from in-
surance availability is different when the insured did not intend to cause the harm but 
a nonmanagerial employee of the insured did cause the harm intentionally.  In that 
situation, and assuming the insured did not somehow encourage or ratify the miscon-
duct of the employee, companies should be able to buy insurance and seek insurance 
companies’ expertise in loss prevention. 
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III.  PROFESSOR OWEN 
Professor Owen offers a subtle read of the articles forming the pro-
posed framework for extracompensatory damages.  In light of his own 
distinguished scholarship,64 which has long been a source of inspiration 
to me, among others, this is not surprising.  Nonetheless, I think there 
are some misunderstandings in his response, and I will use this Part to 
clarify them as well as to address some of the substantive concerns he 
had about insurance and related aspects of the proposed framework. 
A.  Clarifying Some Misunderstandings 
First, I do not argue that aggravated or deterrence damages 
“might well escape constitutional limitation altogether.”65  Rather, for 
those kinds of damages, federalism concerns—at the very least—
would arise and thus would likely require some, if not all, of the same 
constraints on punitive damages that the Supreme Court has already 
established.66  (Retributive damages would warrant additional safe-
guards at least as a policy matter, if not as a constitutional one.) 
Second, and this is a point to which I alluded near the outset, al-
though Professor Owen agrees that there is a theoretical attractiveness 
to reducing both Type I and Type II errors, he disagrees with me 
about the extent to which the law of torts should care about and pur-
sue the reduction of Type II false negatives.67  He views the concern 
for reducing Type II errors through a PAG scheme as especially troub-
ling:  “While Professor Markel avoids enlisting the police and public 
prosecutors in his effort to catch malefactors, his enlistment of every 
member of society is reminiscent of the ruthless use of collaborators 
by police states in the past.”68 
This remark, unfortunately, is wrong and wrong again.  First, 
nothing about my proposed framework suggests anything like displac-
ing or eliminating police and public prosecutors from catching male-
factors.  Second, the proposed framework contains nothing like any 
kind of forced conscription or coercion upon persons to serve as se-
cret informants for the police state, and the suggestion itself is odious.  
While there is a modest financial incentive for private persons to 
 
64 See, e.g., David G. Owen, Civil Punishment and the Public Good, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 103 
(1983); David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REV. 705 (1989). 
65 Owen, supra note 1, at 189. 
66 Markel, Punitive Damages, supra note 2, at 1425-26.  
67 Owen, supra note 1, at 184. 
68 Id. at 185 n.15.  
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channel cases successfully into the retributive damages system, the 
contemplated structure would allow a private party to bring such a 
case only after the government exercised a right of first refusal.69  This 
basically contemplates using the same hybrid enforcement scheme 
currently used in the United States today in the context of environ-
mental law.70  And, unlike in a police state, where there are secret in-
formants, the defendant facing a PAG would be entitled to heigh-
tened procedural safeguards described in detail in Punitive 
Damages71—safeguards essentially endorsed by Professor Owen as de-
sirable mechanisms to reduce the risk of Type I errors involving false 
accusations or determinations of liability in open court. 
Finally, there is an irony (not quite a misunderstanding) worth 
exposing in Professor Owen’s justification for punitive damages.  The 
justification proposed by Professor Owen itself requires greater insti-
tutionalized respect for the reduction of Type II errors involving false 
negatives where tortfeasors escape liability.  To see why, notice that in 
Professor Owen’s normative account of punitive damages, he empha-
sizes how such damages 
restore the equality of the victim in relation to the thief by diminishing the 
extra worth and freedom held illicitly by the thief who stole these funda-
mental goods of personhood from the victim.  By vindicating a person’s 
right to remain free from flagrantly inflicted harm through compensation 
for the aggravated nature of the person’s damages attributable to the ag-
gravated nature of the wrong, the law restores and reaffirms the equal 
worth and freedom of the person victimized by the flagrant wrong.
72
 
Note that it is the law that “reaffirms the equal worth and freedom” of 
the victim, not the agency of the victim.73  And yet, if the law were to 
 
69 See Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 2, at 281-84 (describing the possible 
dangers of and safeguards against vexatious actions brought by nonvictims). 
70 See William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—and Why iI 
Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2146 n.67 (2004) (citing to various studies of citizen-
suit provisions in the environmental law context). 
71 Markel, Punitive Damages, supra note 2, at 1436-62. 
72 Owen, supra note 1, at 187. 
73 Indeed, some of Professor Owen’s prior scholarship notes the value to society, 
and not just the private interest, of punitive damages.  E.g., David G. Owen, A Punitive 
Damages Overview:  Functions, Problems and Reform, 39 VILL. L. REV. 363, 376 (1994) 
(“Punitive damages also serve an important retributive, restitutionary interest for socie-
ty.” (emphasis added)); Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of 
Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1982) (“Punitive (or ‘exemplary’) damages 
are assessed in addition to compensatory damages to punish a defendant who commits 
an aggravated or outrageous act of misconduct against the plaintiff and to deter the 
defendant and others from similar misbehavior in the future.” (emphasis added)). 
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confer a monopoly regarding the choice to settle or forbear from suit 
upon the victim, who may be unduly lazy or merciful, the insult to the 
victim and to the public by the “theft” still occurs by the possibly un-
repentant offender.  That wrong is left to rest without rebuke or sanc-
tion.  Why should that action stand unchecked when there is poten-
tially another way to counter the defendant’s interference with a 
person’s freedom and equality, either through the agency of the state 
or a PAG and either through intermediate sanctions with some safe-
guards or more severe criminal sanctions with a larger panoply of pro-
cedural safeguards?  Professor Owen does not answer this question, but 
his own justification for punitive damages permits, if not demands, a flex-
ible instrument for reducing and sanctioning flagrant misconduct by 
tortfeasors. 
B.  Concerns about Insurance 
Professor Owen expressed some concerns about the clarity of the 
discussion of insurance for retributive damages in the proposed 
framework.74  First, he is uncertain why a straightforwardly retributive 
account of punitive damages would permit insurance for retributive 
damages actions that are reckless.75  He argues that this conclusion is 
problematic, worrying first that it would create the risk that a defen-
dant would not have to lose “ill-gotten gains” and second that such in-
surance permits a wrongdoer to “shift” punishment to “innocent third 
parties.”76  These concerns are misplaced. 
First, Punitive Damages provides an extended discussion regarding 
the claim that insurance would blunt the retributive force of the pe-
nalty.77  Without repeating it, let me highlight a few key points and 
explain why those are relevant to answering Professor Owen’s queries. 
In so doing, I will make one point that ought to have been hig-
hlighted more in the proposed framework if its implication was not 
clear from that discussion. 
Under the proposed framework, a defendant facing penalties of 
retributive damages must (a) always disgorge any ill-gotten gains asso-
ciated with conduct related to the victim and also endure a sanction 
that requires paying (b) a finder’s fee to the plaintiff or PAG, (c) at-
torney’s fees for the relevant part of the labor, and (d) the additional 
 
74 Owen, supra note 1, at 189-90.   
75 Id. at 189. 
76 Id. 
77 Markel, Punitive Damages, supra note 2, at 1469-71. 
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monetary sanction informed by the reprehensibility and the wealth of 
the defendant (assuming that the defendant is an individual).  So 
there are actually four parts to the retributive damages sanction, but 
not each assignment of retributive damages requires all four parts.  Af-
ter all, some cases might not have any ill-gotten gains that arise after 
full compensation to the victim has been paid.  Under the retributive 
damages scheme in the proposed framework, only these aspects would 
be insurable.  The ill-gotten gains would not be insurable,78 since ill-
gotten gains typically arise from noninsurable risks that would be ex-
cludable both by legislation and contract.79  However, should a situa-
tion arise in which one accrues ill-gotten gains through insurable risks 
(in this case, insurance for retributive damages arising from reckless ac-
tions), the defendant would be required to disgorge related profit and 
should be forced to endure the other relevant parts of the retributive 
damages sanction as well.  If the defendant in question paid retributive 
damages insurance, that insurance, under my framework, should not 
cover the entirety of the penalty that is imposed.  As I wrote in the pro-
posed framework, there must also be some form of “coinsurance” paid 
after the adjudication; a coinsurance requirement helps create the sig-
nal that the defendant is being condemned and sanctioned.80 
It is true, however, that I did not specify the precise amount of 
coinsurance, so I view Professor Owen’s challenge here as prompting 
a friendly amendment:  the insurance coverage provided in any given 
case involving a retributive damages sanction should not exceed the 
difference between the full retributive damages sanction (i.e., all four 
parts if applicable) and the disgorgement of any ill-gotten gains net of 
compensatory damages.81  Under such a formula, there would never be 
an insurance recovery for retributive damages that includes the portion 
for any ill-gotten gains. But other aspects of the retributive damages pe-
nalty could be insured when the underlying reckless conduct deals with 
probabilities rather than intended or expected harms. 
Professor Owen’s second insurance-based challenge, respecting 
“punishment” being “shifted” to innocent third parties, warrants more 
 
78 As Professor Miriam Baer has pointed out, “[t]he principle that appears to di-
vide the insurable from the noninsurable conduct is fortuity. . . . If the insured knows 
only that there is a great risk that an event will occur, the event is insurable because it is for-
tuitous.” Miriam Hechler Baer, Insuring Corporate Crime, 83 IND. L.J. 1035, 1083 (2008). 
79 See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
80 Markel, Punitive Damages, supra note 2, at 1463. 
81 Thus, if the total retributive sanction is $100,000, and the amount of ill-gotten 
gains was $20,000, then insurance should not be permitted to cover more than $80,000. 
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skepticism than clarification.  This challenge rests on the erroneous 
conflation of the normative concept of retributive punishment as an 
intended, authorized, and coercive deprivation with the incidental 
suffering of the offender or a third party.  Thus, the claim that insur-
ance shifts punishment to innocent third parties is not true here any 
more than it is true whenever there are incidental (third-party) effects result-
ing from punishment.  There is an important distinction here.  To illu-
strate, when an offender who is also a father or a business owner de-
frauds someone else and is then imprisoned, prison punishes the 
offender even though the offender’s family or employees may suffer.  
The punishment incontrovertibly occurs here and still retains its retri-
butive nature even when the offender, on account of his cheerful disposi-
tion, views the time in prison as an escape from the rat race and as an 
opportunity to express contrition, get in shape, and write poetry.82 
An offender who experiences fewer disutils (or less sting) or nega-
tive consequences associated with objective punishments because of 
his cheerful disposition is not much different than the offender who 
has insurance for retributive damages or who borrows the amount for 
retributive damages through a loan from friends, family, or a credit 
line.  Retributive justice does not, in the main, focus on an offender’s 
distutils in response to punishment.83  If the state (or jury) assigns re-
tributive damages of $10,000, then that is a sum of money you no 
longer have the liberty to control in the manner you see fit.  In the 
criminal context, we do not tell offenders who need to pay a fine that 
they may not borrow money from friends and family to do so.  And 
even when they do borrow money, competent offenders understand 
that they are still being sanctioned by the public. 
As far as I can tell, the main difference between these scenarios is 
that insurance allows someone to pay money in advance toward a pol-
icy of coverage whereas a loan for a fine would typically occur after the 
misconduct occurs and a sanction is imposed.84  Morally speaking, this 
 
82 Cf. Adam Liptak, A Mediocre Criminal, but an Unmatched Jailhouse Lawyer, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 8, 2010, at A12 (discussing Shon Hopwood, who flourished in the prison 
law-library as a jailhouse lawyer and now plans to attend law school). 
83 See generally Dan Markel & Chad Flanders, Bentham on Stilts:  The Bare Relevance of 
Subjectivity to Retributive Justice, 98 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (arguing that the 
various ways in which people experience punishment is not critically relevant to way 
liberal democracies shape retributive punishment). 
84 Of course, if the insurer knew the harm to be insured was intentional, it would 
not only have no reason to insure the conduct (since the harm is not a function of 
probabilistic risk) but it could also be complicit in the wrongdoing if it knew the in-
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distinction is irrelevant.  Perhaps criminal offenders should not be 
permitted to borrow money from friends, banks, or family to pay off 
their criminal fines.  But this again seems misguided by the intuition 
that a defendant should subjectively feel a setback of a particular num-
ber of disutils in his hedonic apparatus in response to the punish-
ment.  Importantly, and for reasons elaborated elsewhere,85 this em-
phasis on subjective experience and the equation of punishment with 
suffering is not a retributive idea, contra some recent scholarship sug-
gesting otherwise.86  It is better thought of as more closely related to 
vengeance rather than retributive justice. 
As I explain in the proposed framework, an insured who had in-
surance for retributive damages arising from reckless misconduct 
would still understand the award of retributive damages as a condem-
natory intermediate sanction, and society should still feel comfortable 
with the idea that such damages are an intermediate civil sanction.  
After all, they go beyond compensation or victim vindication or cost 
internalization and the prerequisite for their award is that the court or 
jury found the defendant in violation of the retributive damages statu-
tory structure (for example, by acting with malice or recklessness) 
thus creating a condemnatory rebuke of the defendant’s actions. 
Last, Professor Owen seems perplexed by my claims that insur-
ance availability in the context of retributive damages predicated on 
reckless behavior can facilitate compensation from judgment proof 
defendants, reduce risks, and achieve loss spreading.87  I am not sure 
what is “elusive” about the reasoning I used, but I am fairly certain 
that these arguments for insurance are commonly made.88  Perhaps it 
was unclear why an avowed retributivist would care about these ostens-
 
sured was planning on harming someone and was seen as bankrolling or ratifying that 
conduct somehow. 
85 Markel & Flanders, supra note 83; see also David C. Gray, Punishment as Suffering, 
64 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (critiquing those scholars who have failed to dis-
tinguish between punishment and suffering). 
86 See generally John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan Masur, Happi-
ness and Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1038-39 (2009) (arguing that defendants’ 
capacities for hedonic adaptation should call for adjustments in the amount of pu-
nishment they receive); Kolber, supra note 35, at 196-97 (“Any justification of punish-
ment that ignores subjective experience, whether retributivist or consequentialist, is 
incomplete and doomed to fail.”). 
87 See Owen, supra note 1, at 189 n.34 (“[Markel’s] arguments with respect to 
judgment-proof defendants and loss spreading . . . are quite elusive.”).   
88 See, e.g., Baer, supra note 74, at 1035; George L. Priest, Insurability and Punitive 
Damages, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1009, 1009-11 (1989). 
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ibly nonretributive considerations.89  If that is the concern, it should 
be laid to rest, as I never identified myself as a monomaniacal retribu-
tivist who cared nothing about consequences or considerations other 
than just deserts.  Indeed, I am an admitted (and early) adherent to 
the camp of consequentialist retributivism,90 which tries to explain the 
internal intelligibility and attractiveness of a practice such as retribu-
tive justice without thinking that such a socio-legal practice must be 
maximized as against all other valuable social projects or moral duties. 
CONCLUSION 
It is a pleasure to have distinguished scholars such as Professors 
Owen and Krauss assess one’s work and to have the opportunity to 
clarify or modify one’s positions upon exchange and reflection.  I am 
very grateful to both Professors Krauss and Owen for taking the time 
to read my work and respond to it in this forum.  Their responses re-
veal a passionate concern for asking hard questions, and they have 
provided me (and others) with much food for thought. I certainly 
found the conversation stimulating, and I hope that it spurs future 
discussions about the endlessly interesting topic of punitive damages. 
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89 It is worth noting that the reduction of risks against persons’ protected rights 
and interests is properly understood as relevant to retributive analysis.  See Tom Baker, 
Reconsidering Insurance for Punitive Damages, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 101, 110-11 (discussing 
how philosopher Jean Hampton’s retributive theory incorporates concerns for preven-
tion); Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 2, at 268 (arguing that under the theory 
of confrontational retributivism, the establishment of institutions furthering retributive 
justice will in practice facilitate the prevention of future wrongdoing). 
90 See, e.g., Michael T. Cahill, Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 
815, 834 (2007).  
